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We present new estimates of the extent of the developing world’s progress against 
poverty. By the frugal $1 per day standard, we find that there were 1.1 billion 
poor in 2001 — almost  400 million fewer than 20 years earlier.  Over the same 
period, the number of poor declined by over 400 million in China, though half of 
this decline was in the first few years of the 1980s.  The number of poor outside 
China rose slightly over the period.  A marked bunching up of people between $1 
and $2 per day has also emerged, with an increase over time in the number of 
people living under $2 per day. Sub-Saharan Africa has become the region with 
the highest incidence of extreme poverty and the greatest depth of poverty. If these 
trends continue then the aggregate $1 per day poverty rate for 1990 will be 
halved by 2015, though only East and South Asia will reach this goal.  
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Introduction 
  A cloud of doubt hangs over our knowledge about the extent of the world’s progress 
against poverty.  A widely cited estimate from World Bank (2002) is that there were 200 million 
fewer poor in the world in 1998 than in 1980.  This figure has been contested, and for good 
reasons.  Deaton (2002a) contrasts this seemingly optimistic assessment of the world’s progress 
against poverty with that in the World Development Report, Attacking Poverty (World Bank, 
2000), which appeared to show little or no progress.  Deaton (2002a) argues that the claim in 
World Bank (2002) was based on methodologically inconsistent estimates from two studies, 
namely Bourguignon and Morisson (2002) (up to 1992) and Chen and Ravallion (2000) (beyond 
that).
2  With reference to the relevant chart in World Bank (2002) (which he refers to as 
Globalization) Deaton writes:  
“The historical data in this chart were assembled by François Bourguignon and Christian 
Morrisson… They derive their estimates by applying (sometimes sketchy and outdated) 
distributional information to the consumption figures from national accounts data, a technique 
that is almost certainly the only methodology that would allow the construction of data for a 
century and a half.  … After 1993, when the Bourguignon and Morrisson data end, Globalization 
uses the poverty estimates that were assembled by Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravallion…. But 
Chen and Ravallion's data from 1987 to 1993, which is when poverty increased, are dropped from 
the chart. In consequence, and without any new information, we go from an assessment that the 
number of poor people in the world was showing little or no decline from 1987 to 1998 in 
Attacking Poverty to an assessment, in Globalization, of a continuous and accelerating decline 
from 1980 to 1998.” 
    
These concerns are too important to ignore.  We agree with Deaton that the splicing of these 
different data sources is highly questionable.  The only solution is to construct a new, internally 
consistent, series over the 1980s and 1990s.   
                                                 
2   Wade (2004) also questions the 200 million figure. However, misdiagnoses the problem, by 
confusing changes in the methods used to count the world’s poor with the methodological issues related 
to the way World Bank (2002) used different data sources.  In fact, the Chen-Ravallion estimates used in 
World Bank (2002) would be judged internally consistent by Wade’s criteria. The Deaton critique is more 
persuasive since it is grounded on a well-researched understanding of the methods involved.   4
This paper offers a new assessment of progress in reducing poverty over 1981-2001 using 
consistent data and methods — closely following the methods underlying the Attacking Poverty 
numbers, which had been based on Chen and Ravallion (2000).  In common with our past 
estimates, we draw on nationally representative surveys as much as feasible.  The paper reviews 
our methods of measuring poverty from those surveys and notes any changes from past 
estimates, though we refer readers to other sources for further discussion of our methods and 
alternatives.
3  The new estimates presented here supersede all our previous estimates, in that we 
have re-calculated everything back in time on a consistent basis incorporating the new data.
4  
This paper summarizes our results in a standard regional tabulation following past work.  
However, we have also created a web-based interactive tool, PovcalNet that allows users to 
access the primary distributions and so estimate poverty measures for alternative country 
groupings or for a selected set of individual countries (http://iresearch.worldbank.org/povcalnet).       
A notable feature of these new estimates is that we go back to the early 1980s, allowing 
an assessment of the validity of the aforementioned claim in World Bank (2002).   We have 
previously resisted going back this far, given our concerns about the coverage and quality of the 
survey data available for the early 1980s.  Our efforts to expand coverage have helped allay our 
fears about reliability for the early 1980s.  However, it is clear that our estimates for the first year 
in our series, 1981, are not as reliable as the rest of the series.  
We find that the 200 million figure is probably an under-estimate. Indeed, our best 
estimates suggest that it is almost twice that number.  That is good news.  However, a closer 
                                                 
3   For a critical overview of our estimation methods see Deaton (2002b), which covers the main 
issues raised in the literature.  Ravallion (2002a) replies to Deaton’s comments; also see Ravallion 
(2003a) for further discussion.   
4      The latest individual country estimates, can be found at the web site: 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/povmonitor/.  The latest year’s estimates at country level are also 
published in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (see, for example, World Bank, 2004).     5
inspection of the data leaves little room for complacency about the world’s progress against 
poverty.  Indeed, the picture that emerges is one of highly uneven progress, with serious setbacks 
in some regions and time periods.  And we find that the number living under $2 per day rose.    
It should not be forgotten that there are limitations to our measures.  There are continuing 
concerns about aspects of the underlying data, including the Purchasing Power Parity exchange 
rates, the accuracy and comparability of the surveys used, and intrinsic limitations of the welfare 
measures based on those surveys.  A potentially important example of the latter is the fact that 
our definition of poverty does not directly reflect inequality within the household.   
The next section describes the coverage of the survey data.  We then discuss the poverty 
line and exchange rates, followed by the measures of poverty.  Our main results are then 
discussed before concluding. 
   
Coverage of the household surveys 
This is our first attempt to estimate global poverty measures back to the early 1980s.  Our 
last paper provided estimates starting in 1987 (Chen and Ravallion, 2000, 2001).  In retrospect,  
starting the series in 1987 was an unfortunate choice, since the late 1980s and early 1990s was a 
difficult time for the world’s poor, given sharply lower growth in both China and India.  By 
going back further in time, we hope to get a clearer idea of the long-term trend.    
We draw on 454 surveys covering 97 countries representing 93% of the population of all 
low and middle income countries (Part 2 member countries of the World Bank).  Taking the 
most recent survey for each country, about 1.1 million households were interviewed. The surveys 
were mostly done by governmental statistics offices as part of their routine operations. 
Our poverty measures are estimated from the primary (unit record or tabulated) survey 
data. We have not used any secondary sources for measuring poverty at each survey round   6
(unlike all other compilations of distributional data and global poverty measures that we know 
of), although we do use other data sources for interpolation purposes, given that the surveys of 
different countries do not coincide in time.  Households are ranked by either consumption or 
income per person.  The distributions are weighted by household size and sample expansion 
factors so that a given fractile (such as the poorest decile) should have the same share of the 
country-specific population across the sample.  Thus our poverty counts give the number of 
people living in households with per capita consumption or income below the poverty line. The 
data come in various forms, ranging from micro data to specially designed grouped tabulations 
from the raw data constructed following our guidelines.  Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Chen et 
al. (1994) describe our estimation methods for grouped data. 
As in past work, we have tried to eliminate obvious comparability problems, either by re-
estimating the consumption/income aggregates or the more radical step of dropping a survey.  
However, there are problems that we cannot deal with.  It is known that differences in survey 
methods (such as in questionnaire design) can create non-negligible differences in the estimates 
obtained for consumption or income. For example, while one–week recall for food consumption 
is common in surveys, there are some countries that use a longer period, which is likely to give a 
lower estimate of consumption and hence higher measured poverty.  
A specific problem that has received attention in the recent literature concerns the 55
th 
round of India’s National Sample Survey (NSS), for 1999/2000.  There is a potentially serious 
comparability problem between this survey and previous NSS rounds; discussions of the 
problems with this survey can be found in Datt and Ravallion (2002) and Deaton (2002b, 2003). 
We used Deaton’s (2003) adjusted distributions, in an attempt to assure greater comparability 
with previous NSS rounds. The official distributions from the 55
th round give a lower poverty   7
rate in 1999/00 (32.3% below $1 per day, as compared to 34.8% using Deaton’s corrections).  
(The distributions are of course the same in the previous large sample survey, for which we 
obtain a $1 per day poverty rate of 41.9%.)  However, Deaton’s correction requires an 
unchanging probability of being poor conditional on consumption of the  goods that appear to 
have been unaffected by the change in survey design. Changes in relative prices can cast doubt 
on this assumption (Datt and Ravallion, 2002; Sen and Himanshu, 2003). 
Possibly we are slightly over-estimating the decline in poverty in India between the 55
th 
and previous rounds.  An alternative approach to comparing the surveys for 1999/00 with the 
previous large sample survey of 1993 has been proposed by Sundaram and Tendulkar (2003).  
(This entails comparing estimates over time based on a mixed recall period, as distinct from the 
uniform recall period used by the official data and by Deaton; the comparison is only possible 
between these two surveys.)   Using the Sundaram-Tendulkar distributions, the $1 per day 
poverty rate for India falls from 38.7% to 32.3% between 1993 and 1999/00 — a 6.4% point 
drop, as compared to our estimate using the Deaton adjusted distributions of 7.1% points.   
The Appendix lists the surveys used, with their dates and whether we use consumption or 
income (a choice we return to).  Population coverage varies greatly by region, ranging from 74% 
of the population of the Middle East and North Africa to 98% of the population of South Asia. 
Not all of the available surveys were included.  The main reasons for excluding a survey were 
that essential data were missing (such as for the purchasing power parity exchange rates or 
consumer price indices used to update poverty lines over time), or that there were known to be 
serious comparability problems with the rest of the data set.  
Naturally, the further back we go, the fewer the number of surveys.  And coverage 
deteriorates in the last year or two of the series, given the lags in survey processing.  A simple   8
but useful guide to the reliability of our estimates is to count the number of surveys by year.  We 
give this count in Figure 1, and also the three-year moving total centered on each year (given that 
having a survey last year or next year can help greatly in estimating poverty this year).  By this 
measure, our estimates around the mid to late 1990s are the most reliable while our estimate for 
1981 is clearly the least reliable.  We have only 15 surveys up to 1983, though it rises sharply to 
a total of 32 surveys for the period up to 1985.  By contrast we have 86 surveys during 1986-90.   
Most regions are still quite well covered, from at least the latter half of the 1980s (East 
and South Asia being well covered from 1981 onwards).  Two exceptions stand out.  
Unsurprisingly, we have weak country coverage in Eastern Europe and Central Asia for the 
1980s; most of these countries did not officially exist then.  More worrying is the lack of 
coverage for Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s.  Indeed, our estimates for the early 1980s rely 
heavily on projections based on distributions for the late 1980s.  Table 1 gives the average 
survey year by region for each reference year.  While Africa is clearly the region in which survey 
coverage has most improved when compared to our past estimates (Chen and Ravallion, 2001), 
the weakness of our coverage of Africa should be kept in mind when interpreting our results.   
However, even in regions with seemingly good survey coverage in the 1980s, there are 
question marks about some of the data.  The other side of the coin to the fact that household 
survey data for developing countries have improved in the 1990s is that they were not as good in 
the 1980s.  Take the example of the largest country by population, China.  We use newly 
available income distributions for China from surveys done in 1980 (rural areas) and 1981 
(urban), kindly provided to us by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).  However, China was 
only beginning to do national household surveys at this time, and naturally these early efforts 
were not as good (Chen and Ravallion, 1996).  The sample sizes for these early surveys are   9
smaller than the other NBS surveys for China that we use; 16,000 randomly sampled households 
were interviewed for the 1980 survey in rural areas of China, and about 9,000 for the urban 
sample (in 1981) — by contrast the 1985 surveys for China had sample sizes of 67,000 in rural 
areas and 24,000 in urban areas (rising to 31,000 after 1985).   
  
Exchange rates and poverty lines 
We have used the same Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimates for consumption as 
Chen and Ravallion (2001), which were produced by the World Bank’s Data Group; the data 
sources and methods are described in Ahmad (2003).  For 69 of our 97 countries, the PPPs are 
based on price and consumption basket data collected by the 1993 International Comparison 
Project (ICP).  For almost all those countries that did not participate in the 1993 ICP, the Bank’s 
PPPs are based on interpolations from cross-country regressions (as described in Ahmad, 2003).  
Two exceptions are China and India for which the Bank’s PPPs are based on other sources; 
India’s PPP was an update of the country’s 1985 PPP while China’s was based on a credible 
independent (non-ICP) study of prices levels in 10 cities of China (Ahmad, 2003).  As in Chen 
and Ravallion (2000), there are five countries for which we use Penn World Tables (PWT) in 
preference to the World Bank’s PPPs, namely Philippines, Mauritania, Ghana, Nicaragua and 
Uganda.  For these countries the Bank’s PPPs gave poverty rates that were implausibly high in 
our judgment, while the consumption PPPs for 1993 from PWT (Version 5.6) gave more 
believable estimates.
5 
The international poverty line in our work prior to Chen and Ravallion (2001) was set at 
$1 per day at 1985 PPP (more precisely it was $31 per month or $1.02 per day; see Ravallion et 
                                                 
5   Note that, since we are using the same PPP rates as Chen and Ravallion (2001), we use PWT 5.6, 
which was the latest available PWT at that time.  (PWT 6.1 has since become available).    10
al., 1991).  The original $1 per day poverty line was chosen as being representative of the 
poverty lines found amongst low-income countries (Ravallion et al., 1991). The same principle 
was applied by Chen and Ravallion (2001) in up-dating the poverty line using the new PPPs for 
1993.  Here it must be noted that the 1985 PPPs based on Penn World Tables (PWT) are not 
comparable with the Bank’s PPPs at base 1993, both in terms of the primary data and the 
methods used.  So one cannot simply adjust for inflation in the US between 1985 and 1993 to 
update the poverty line; indeed, that gives a line that is well above those found in low-income 
countries (Chen and Ravallion, 2001).
6  To be consistent with the original aim of using a poverty 
line that can be considered representative of the lines actually found in poor countries, we 
recalculated the $ value of the original set of poverty lines using the new PPPs, and compared 
this to mean consumption, also calculated by the new PPPs.  Following Chen and Ravallion 
(2001), the resulting poverty line is $1.08 per day ($32.74 per month) in 1993 PPP prices; this is 
the median of the lowest ten poverty lines within the set of countries used by Ravallion et al. 
(1991).  This is the main poverty line we will focus on here, and we will refer to it as the “$1 per 
day” line or “extreme poverty.”   
However, the poverty rate on this basis must be deemed a conservative estimate, whereby 
aggregate poverty in the developing world is defined by perceptions of poverty found in the 
poorest countries.  (This is not a new observation, but was argued explicitly by World Bank, 
1990, and Ravallion et al., 1991.)   We also consider two broader definitions.  In one, we count 
                                                 
6   Thus we do not accept the claims made by Reddy and Pogge (2002) and Wade (2004) that we 
have lowered the real value of the poverty line.  They ignore the fact that there has been (in effect) a PPP 
devaluation of poor countries relative to the US with the switch from the 1985 to 1993 based PPPs, 
reflecting both the new ICP price data and differences in methods of measuring the PPP rate. For further 
discussion of the Reddy and Pogge criticisms of our methods see Ravallion (2002b).   
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as poor all those who would be judged so by standards more typical of middle-income countries.  
For this purpose we use a poverty line set at twice the $1 per day line.   
Our second definition allows for “relative poverty.” Chen and Ravallion (2001) proposed 
an operational approach for measuring relative poverty, building on Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(1999). Our measure of relative poverty assumes that a person is not poor if she meets the “$1 
per day” absolute consumption standard and consumes more than some proportion of the mean 
consumption in the country of residence.  The constant of proportionality was set at one-third; 
this gave the best fit to the data set on poverty lines for developed and developing countries used 
in setting the $1.08 poverty line (Chen and Ravallion, 2001).  The relative poverty line for any 
country is then given by the larger of $1.08 and one-third of mean daily private consumption per 
capita at 1993 PPP. We fix the real value of the relative poverty line over time for each country.  
So these poverty lines are relative between countries but absolute over time.  (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2001, discuss this choice further.) Making the poverty lines relative over time would 
mean that for those countries with mean consumption above $3.23 per day the poverty measures 
will be independent of absolute levels of consumption (and depend solely on the percentile of the 
population for which the Lorenz curve has a slope of one-third).   
 
Measuring poverty from the surveys 
We compute three poverty measures.  The first measure is the headcount index given by 
the percentage of population living in households with consumption or income per person below 
the poverty line.  This is the easiest measure to interpret, but it has the well-known deficiency 
that it tells us nothing about differences in the depth of poverty below the line.  We also give 
estimates of the number of poor, as obtained by applying the estimated headcount index to the 
population of each region (under the assumption that countries without surveys have the same   12
headcount index on average as those with surveys).  We also give results for a third measure, the 
poverty gap index, which gives mean distance below the poverty line as a proportion of the 
poverty line (where the mean is taken over the whole population, counting the non-poor as 
having zero poverty gaps.)  PovcalNet also gives estimates of the squared poverty gap, in which 
the individual poverty gaps are weighted by the gaps themselves, so as to reflect inequality 
amongst the poor (Foster et al., 1984). 
In keeping with our past work, we aim to measure poverty in terms of household 
consumption expenditure per capita. Of the 454 surveys that we draw on, 247 allow us to 
estimate the distribution of consumption expenditures; this is true of all the surveys used in the 
Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Whenever there is a choice 
we use consumption in preference to income, on the grounds that consumption is likely to be the 
better measure of current welfare.  For about one quarter of the cases in which we do not have 
consumption distributions we still have survey-based estimates of mean consumption. For those 
cases we replace the income mean by the consumption mean leaving the Lorenz curve the same 
(i.e., all incomes are scaled up by the ratio of the consumption mean to the income mean).  There 
is however no obvious basis for adjusting the Lorenz curve; one expects higher inequality in an 
income distribution than a consumption distribution for the same place and data.   
Our previous estimates for China in Chen and Ravallion (2001) relied on income Lorenz 
curves but we used the survey means for household consumption expenditure per capita supplied 
by NBS.  For this update we have been able to obtain complete consumption distributions from 
NBS back to 1990.  To maintain consistency with our methods for other countries we have 
switched to consumption (for both the distribution and the mean) from 1990 onwards, though we 
have no choice but to keep our old method for the 1980s.  However, this raises a concern about   13
comparability between our estimates for the 1990s for China with those for the 1980s.  To assess 
if this is a problem, we also calculated our estimates for the 1990s using the old method.  Table 2 
compares the two sets of estimates for the 1990s.  They match up quite closely, so the 
comparisons over time do not appear to be of concern.  Chen and Ravallion (2004) discuss this 
and other issues concerning China’s poverty and inequality data in greater detail. 
One important difference with Chen and Ravallion (2001) is that when only an income 
distribution is available, we do not follow our past practice of re-scaling mean income by one 
minus the national saving rate.  This practice was questioned by Deaton (2002b), and in Chen 
and Ravallion (2001) we noted the implications of dropping this re-scaling.  Since then we have 
assembled surveys for 27 countries for which we have both consumption and income 
distributions, so we could test this assumption in our past work by calculating the poverty 
measures using both consumption and income for the same country.  We found only a small 
difference and statistically insignificant difference between the two sets of estimates; 
consumption had a lower mean but also lower inequality, with the effect that poverty measures 
were quite close. The mean headcount index for consumption was 17.8% using the $1 per day 
line, as compared to 21.2% for income; the difference is not statistically significant (t=0.73; 
n=27).  For the $2 line, the mean headcount index was slightly higher for consumption (48.2% 
versus 44.8% for income) but again the difference is not statistically significant (t=0.49).  So we 
abandoned our past practice of re-scaling the mean for income surveys.  The main implication is 
that our poverty measures for Latin America (where income surveys are more common than 
elsewhere) drop a few percentage points. 
Having converted the international poverty line at PPP to local currency in 1993 we 
convert it to the prices prevailing at each survey date using the country-specific official   14
Consumer Price Index (CPI).
7  The weights in this index may or may not accord well with 
consumer budget shares at the poverty line. In periods of relative price shifts, this will bias our 
comparisons of the incidence of poverty over time, depending on the extent of utility-
compensated substitution possibilities for people at the poverty line.  
 To estimate regional poverty at a given reference year (1998, say) we "line up" the 
surveys in time using the same method as in our past work. We started the series in 1981 and 
made estimates at three yearly intervals, though there were too few surveys for 2002, so we 
estimated for 2001 instead.  We thus make estimates for 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 
1999, 2001.  We refer to these as the “reference years,” as distinct from the “survey years” which 
are spread over the interval 1979-2002 (Figure 1).   
Of the 97 countries, 9 have only one survey; 19 have two surveys and 69 have three or 
more surveys over the period.  If there is only one survey for a country then we estimate 
measures for each reference year by applying the growth rate in real private consumption per 
person from the national accounts to the survey mean — assuming that the Lorenz curve for that 
country does not change.
8 This seems the best option for dealing with this problem, though there 
can be no guarantee that the Lorenz curve would not have shifted or that a survey-based measure 
of consumption would have grown at the same rate as private consumption in the national 
accounts. For example, growth in the latter might reflect growth in the spending by non-profit 
organizations — which are not separated from households in the national accounts for most 
developing countries — rather than household spending (Ravallion, 2003b).  
                                                 
7       Note that the same poverty line is generally used for urban and rural areas.  There are two 
exceptions.  In China and India, we estimate poverty measures separately for urban and rural areas and 
use sector specific CPIs.  In the case of India, we also use a corrected version of the rural CPI (the 
Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers) as discussed in Datt and Ravallion (1998).  
8      For Nigeria we used the GDP per capita growth rate.  Substantial changes in Nigeria’s method of 
calculating private consumption made it impossible to construct a consistent series for consumption.    15
When the reference date (1993 say) is between two surveys (1989 and 1995 say), one 
option would simply be to interpolate between the two surveys.  However, this ignores the extra 
information we have from the national accounts data.  Ignoring this information could be 
particularly problematic when there is a long time period between surveys.   To bring the extra 
information available from national accounts into the picture we proceeded as follows.  We first 
estimate mean consumption at the reference year using the national accounts growth rate 
between the survey year and the reference year.  Based on the example here, we have two means 
at the reference year based on two surveys, M93(89) and M93(95) where M93(t) is the estimated 
mean for 1993 using the survey for year t. Based on the 1989 distribution and M93(89), we get 
the H93(89), the headcount index obtained using the 1993 mean and the 1989 distribution. 
Similarly, based on the 1995 distribution and M93, we get H93(95).  Then the poverty headcount 
for 1993 is estimated by the weighted average of H93(89) and H93(95).
9   
 
Results 
Table 3 gives our estimates of the headcount indices for $1.08 at 1993 PPP for 1981-2001 
at three-year intervals.  The table also gives our results for twice this line.  Table 4 gives the 
corresponding counts of the number of poor for each poverty line.   
Over the 20 year period, we find that the percentage of the population of the developing 
world living below $1 per day was almost halved, falling from 40% to 21% over 1981-2001.  
(Expressed as a proportion of the population of the world, the decline is from 33% to 18%. This 
                                                 
9   Thus H93=[(1995-1993)/(1995-1989)].H93(89)+[(1993-1989)/(1995-1989)].H93(95).  In a small 
number of cases this method did not give sensible results in that either M93(89) or M93(95) was outside 
the interval [M(89), M(95)] even though the NA growth rates were positive for both 1989-93 and 1993-
95.  In these cases we ignored the national accounts data and fell back on simply estimated M(93) using 
the growth rate in survey means between 1989 and 1995.  
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assumes that there is nobody living below $1 per day in the developed countries.)  The number 
of poor fell by 390 million, from 1.5 billion in 1981 (Table 4). 
There was clearly more progress in some periods than in others.  As we have already 
noted, the late 1980s and early 1990s were a difficult period for the world’s poor, with low 
growth in both China and India.  Once growth was restored, the rate of poverty reduction by the 
$1 per day standard in the 1990s had returned to its long-term trend.  The percentage below $1 
per day fell from 28% to 21% over 1990-2001, which is about the same trend decline (in 
percentage points per year) as for 1984-2001 as a whole.  The number of poor fell by about 130 
million in the 1990s.  The poverty measures for $2 per day follow a broadly similar pattern over 
time, though with a less dramatic decline in the early 1980s, and even stronger signs of 
stagnation in the period around 1990 (Table 3). 
Our estimates suggest less progress in getting over the $2 per day line.  The poverty rate 
by this higher standard has fallen from 67% in 1981 to 53% in 2001 (Table 3).  This has not been 
a sufficient decline to prevent a rise in the number of people living below $2 per day, from 2.4 
billion to 2.7 billion (Table 4).  Thus the number of people living between $1 and $2 has actually 
risen sharply over these two decades, from about 1 billion to 1.6 billion.  This marked “bunching 
up” of poor people just above the $1 line suggests that a great many people in the world remain 
vulnerable to aggregate economic slow downs.    
Regional differences.  Performance against poverty has not been uniform across regions.  
Indeed, there have been notable changes in regional poverty rankings over this period.  Looking 
back to 1981, East Asia was the region with the highest incidence of extreme poverty in the 
world, with 58% of the population living below $1 per day.  South Asia had the next highest 
poverty rate, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa and   17
lastly, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  Twenty years later, Sub-Saharan Africa had swapped 
places with East Asia where the headcount index had fallen to 15%, with South Asia staying in 
second place.  Eastern Europe and Central Asia had overtaken the Middle-East and North Africa.  
The ordering of regions is not, however, robust to the choice of poverty line, with South Asia 
edging out Africa for the highest headcount index in 2001 using $2 per day, and with South Asia 
edging out East Asia for the highest index in 1981. 
The composition of world poverty has changed noticeably over the period. The number 
of poor has fallen in Asia, but risen elsewhere.  There has been dramatic progress in East Asia, 
where the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 1990 “$1 per day” poverty rate 
by 2015 was already reached in 2001.  China’s progress against absolute poverty was a key 
factor.  Looking back to 1981, China’s incidence of poverty (measured by the percentage below 
$1 per day) was roughly twice that for the rest of the developing world; by the mid-1990s, the 
Chinese poverty rate had fallen well below average. There were 400 million fewer people living 
under $1 per day in China in 2001 than 20 years earlier, though a staggering half of this decline 
was in the period 1981-1984 (Table 4).  This was huge progress for the world’s poor.  The most 
plausible explanation would appear to be China’s reforms starting in the late 1970s; the reforms 
de-collectivized agriculture and introduced the “household responsibility system” giving farmers 
considerably greater control over their land and output choices (Chen and Ravallion, 2004c, 
discuss this and alternative explanations for China’s success against absolute poverty.)  This was 
a one-off event, suggesting that the sharp drop in global poverty by the $1 per day standard in the 
early 1980s was also unusual.  There was a further drop of 120 million in the poverty count 
between 1993 and 1996.  This is generally attributed to the substantial, but short-lived, increase   18
in 1994 in the procurement price for foodgrains paid by the government, which effectively made 
a large income transfer to the rural sector (see World Bank, 1997).   
Table 5 gives the trend rates of decline in the headcount index for the “$1 per day” line.  
The long-run trend decline in the global poverty rate over 1981-2001 is 0.86 percentage points 
per year.  The period 1984-2001 is more indicative of the overall trend, given the unusual large 
decline in extreme poverty between 1981 and 1984 due to China’s de-collectivization.  Focusing 
on the 1990s could also be considered deceptive, given that it started with relatively high 
poverty, given the stalled growth in China and India around this time.  For the period 1984-2001, 
the trend is 0.66 percentage points per year.
10 
  For the developing world outside China, the headcount index for $1 per day fell from 
32% to 23% over 1981-2001.  This was not sufficient to prevent a rise in the total number of 
poor, which went from 850 million in 1981 to 880 million in 2001.  The decline in the headcount 
index over time in the developing world excluding China was close to linear (Figure 2), with a 
trend decline of  0.42 percentage points per year (with a standard error of 0.029).   
Turning to specific regions, the number of poor has also fallen in South Asia, from 475 
million in 1981 to about 430 million in 2001.  The poverty rate in that region fell from 52% to 
31%.  The South Asia series suggest a remarkably robust trend rate of decline in the $1 per day 
headcount index of 1% point per year (Table 5). (For South Asia a linear trend clearly fits better 
than an exponential one.)  If maintained, this will be sufficient to reach the MDG.  The critical 
value needed to reach the MDG of –0.83 points per year is also outside the 95% confidence 
interval of (-0.87, -1.09) for our estimate of South Asia’s trend rate of poverty reduction. 
                                                 
10   This assumes that the trend is linear rather than exponential (linear in logs).  The exponential 
trends are 2.9% per year using all eight years and 2.5% per year ignoring the first year. 
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  The extent of the “bunching up” that has occurred between $1 and $2 per day is 
particularly striking in both East and South Asia, where we find a total of 1.2 billion people 
living between $1 and $2 per day in East and South Asia combined, roughly equally split 
between the two regions. While this points again to the vulnerability of the poor, by the same 
token it also suggests that substantial further impacts on poverty can be expected from economic 
growth, provided that it does not come with substantially higher inequality.      
There is less sign of progress against poverty outside Asia.  We find an increase in the 
number of poor in Latin America, with roughly constant poverty rate over time (10% for $1 per 
day; 25% for $2, which is closer to poverty lines found in that region).  The Middle East and 
North Africa region was experiencing a marked downward trend in the poverty rate during the 
1980s, but in the 1990s the rate stabilized at around 2% for $1 per day and a little over 20% for 
$2 per day.     
We find a rising incidence and number of poor in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(EECA) comparing the 1990s with the 1980s.  Very few people live below $1 per day in this 
region.  The poverty rate by the $2 standard rose from almost 2% in 1981 to 20% in 2001.  
However, the paucity of survey data for this region in the 1980s should not be forgotten.  Thus 
our estimates are heavily based on interpolations, which do not allow for any changes in 
distribution.  One would expect that distribution was better from the point of view of the poor in 
EECA in the 1980s, in which case poverty would have been even lower than we estimate.  We 
also see some signs of recent progress for the poorest in ECA, though it is clearly too early to say 
if this represents a change in trend. 
The incidence of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa has fluctuated around a mean of 45% for 
the $1 per day line (75% for $2 per day), with no significant trend in either direction (Table 5).    20
The number of poor has almost doubled in Sub-Saharan Africa over 1981-2001, from 164 
million to 316 million living below $1 per day.  The share of the world’s poor by this measure 
living in Africa has risen from 11% in 1981 to 29% in 2001.   
Table 5 also gives the critical rate of decline in poverty needed to achieve the MDG by 
2015.  (For this table we dropped Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the Middle East and 
North Africa since there were so few people living below this line in 1990.)  These actual trend 
rates of decline in the aggregate $1 per day poverty rate would be sufficient to achieve the MDG 
if progress were to be maintained until 2015.  However, the variation over time indicated by our 
series points to a need for caution.  For the full time period we have studied, the critical trend 
needed to reach the MDG is just outside the 95% confidence interval for the estimated trends.  
So we can claim with 95% confidence that the trend over 1981-2001 exceeds that needed to 
halve the 1990 headcount index for $1 per day.  However, as we have noted, 1981-84 was an 
unusual sub-period, and our estimate for 1981 is also the weakest of the series in terms of the 
survey data coverage.  The critical trend for the MDG is within the 95% confidence interval for 
the period 1984-2001.  Based on the series starting in 1984, we can only say with about 90% 
confidence that the aggregate trend will exceed the critical value needed to halve the 1990 
poverty rate. 
Poverty gap indices.  So far we have focused solely on the headcount index.  Table 6 
gives the poverty gap indices.  Comparing Tables 3 and 6, it can be seen that the regional 
rankings in terms of the poverty gap index are the same as those for the headcount index, and the 
changes over time follow the same patterns.   
The most striking feature of the results in Table 6 is the depth of poverty in Africa, with a 
$1 per day poverty gap index of 20%, as compared to 6% for the developing world as a whole.    21
Furthermore, the mean income of Africa’s poor has been falling over time (Table 7). (Noting that 
the poverty gap index (PG) is related to the headcount index (H) as PG=(1-M)H where M is the 
ratio of the mean income of the poor to the poverty line.)  The mean income of those living under 
$1 per day in Africa was $0.64 per person per day in 1981 and fell to $0.60 in 2001.  For the $2 
line, the mean income of Africa’s poor remained roughly constant.  By contrast, the overall mean 
income of the poor in the developing world as a whole tended to rise over time, from about $0.70 
in 1981 to $0.77 in 2001 by the $1 line, and even more markedly for the $2 line, from $1.02 to 
$1.25.  Poverty has become shallower in the world as a whole, but not in Africa.   
The fact that the mean income of the poor is lowest in Africa implies that, unless 
inequality falls sufficiently, it will take more growth to have the same proportionate impact on 
Africa’s poverty gap as for other regions.  This is borne out by calculating the elasticities of the 
poverty gap index to growth in the mean holding inequality constant (so that all levels of income 
grow at the same rate).  The higher the mean income of the poor the higher the absolute elasticity 
of the poverty gap index to the overall mean.
11  This elasticity is -1.3 for Sub-Saharan Africa in 
2001 versus -3.9 in (say) South Asia (both for the $1 per day line). The corresponding elasticities 
for other regions in 2001 are -3.3 for East Asia (-3.2 for China), -3.7 for Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, -1.8 for Latin America, -4.3 for the Middle East and North Africa (though this is 
deceptive, given that proportionately fewer people live below the $1 per day line; using the $2 
line the elasticity falls to –2.8).  The overall elasticity for the developing world in 2001 is -2.5.  
The elasticity has fallen (in absolute value) over time in Africa, though only slightly (from –1.4 
in 1981), but has risen in the developing world as a whole (from -1.9 in 1981). 
                                                 
11   In particular, it is readily verified that when all levels of income grow at the same rate, the 
elasticity of the poverty gap index to the overall mean is -M/(1-M) where M is the ratio of the mean 
income of the poor to the poverty line.    22
Relative poverty. So far we have focused on absolute poverty measures, which aim to 
treat the same consumption level the same way no matter what country a person happens to live 
in.  To see how much our results might be affected by making an allowance for relative 
deprivation, Table 8 gives our estimates of the extent of relative poverty, whereby the poverty 
line is the larger of $1.08 per day and one third of mean consumption in 1993 (as discussed in 
section 3).  Figure 4 graphs the numbers of poor by region, analogously to Figure 3. 
As one would expect, the incidence of relative poverty is noticeably higher for Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa.  Indeed, the 
relative poverty rate in Latin America overtakes South Asia in the early 1990s, making Latin 
America the second poorest region by this measure. And Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
overtakes East Asia by the mid-1990s.  While there are marked changes in regional rankings, the 
aggregate trends over time are quite similar.  (This is of course a consequence in part at least of 
the fact that our relative poverty lines are absolute over time.)  The incidence of relative poverty 
in the developing world as a whole is 29% in 2001, down from 50% in 1981.  The total number 
of poor by this measure rises to 1.5 billion in 2001, down from 1.8 billion in 1981.  However, the 
total number of poor by our relative poverty measure has shown no trend decline since the mid-
1980s.  And excluding China, the number of relatively poor has remained around 1.2 billion, 
though showing a slight upward trend in the 1990s. 
 
Conclusions 
We have offered new estimates of the extent of poverty in the developing world over the 
period from 1981 to 2001.  We have followed past practice in focusing primarily on an 
international poverty line that accords with poverty lines typical of the poorest countries. For this 
purpose we used a poverty line of about $1 per day, though we have also considered a line set at   23
twice this value, as well as a relative poverty line that rises with average consumption when this 
exceeds about $3 per day.  We have drawn on newly available household surveys and all past 
estimates have been revised in the light of all new data.  Our estimates appear to be more 
internally consistent and comparable over time than past estimates, including those of World 
Bank (2002), which argued that there were 200 million fewer poor at the end of twentieth 
century than 20 years earlier. 
We find that the 200 million figure is an underestimate.  Indeed, we find a figure almost 
twice that size, entailing a near halving of the 1981 poverty rate of 40% by 2001. 
The precise time period one considers is crucial, however.  Progress against extreme 
poverty has been uneven over time. The most dramatic reduction in poverty was in the early 
1980s; about half of the 390 million drop in the $1 per day poverty count between 1981 and 2001 
occurred in the first three years of that period. This coincided with the sharp drop in extreme 
poverty in China in the aftermath of the reforms that (amongst other things) abandoned the 
socialist mode of agricultural production in favor of the household-based farming and freer 
markets for farm produce.  This contrasts with the period 1987-93 in which the number of people 
living under $1 per day stayed roughly constant at around 1.2 billion.  There was more progress 
in the 1990s, once growth had been restored in the most populous countries, China and India.  
There were 100 million fewer poor by the $1 per day standard at the end of the 1990s than at the 
beginning.  For assessing overall trends we have argued that one should focus on the period 
1984-2001.   
While the overall picture is good news, it is no cause for complacency.  The 390 million 
fewer poor by the $1 per day standard over 1981-2001 are still poor by the standards of middle-
income developing countries, and certainly by the standards of what poverty means in rich   24
countries.  And our estimates indicate that the number of people under $2 per day has actually 
risen.  Clearly a great many people remain poor and vulnerable to aggregate economic slow 
downs. 
Nor has this aggregate progress for the poorest over the 1980s and 1990s been shared by 
all regions.  The dramatic progress against poverty in the early 1980s owes much to China.  If 
one focuses on the developing world outside China then the number of poor by the $1 per day 
standard has changed rather little — indeed, it has risen slightly.  The composition of world 
poverty has changed noticeably.  Numbers of poor have fallen in Asia, but risen elsewhere.  The 
share of the world’s poor living in Africa has risen dramatically.  Not only has Africa emerged in 
the 1990s as the region with the highest incidence of poverty, the depth of poverty is also 
markedly higher than that found in other regions — suggesting that without lower inequality 
economic growth in Africa will have a harder time reducing poverty in the future than elsewhere.   
If it is maintained over 2001-15 then the trend rate of decline in the incidence of poverty 
by the $1 per day standard over 1984-2001 will be sufficient to halve the 1990 aggregate 
headcount index by 2015, consistent with the Millennium Development Goals.   However, this 
goal will have only been reached in one part of the world — East and South Asia. 
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Table 1: Average date of the surveys used for each reference year 
 
 
  1981  1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  1981.5  1984.6 1987.4 1990.4 1992.5 1996.1 1999.1 2000.4
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  1988.2  1988.1 1988.3 1989.6 1993.6 1995.7 1998.9 1999.7
Latin America and Caribbean  1983.2  1984.7 1986.6 1990.4 1992.5  1996.1  1998.1 2000.1
Middle East and North Africa  1987.1  1987.8 1988.1 1990.0 1993.0  1996.0  1998.0 1998.2
South  Asia  1980.9  1983.9 1987.2 1989.7 1993.0 1995.9 1999.0 1999.4
Sub-Saharan  Africa  1988.6  1988.3 1989.6 1990.2 1993.0 1995.1 1996.6 1997.0
Total    1982.8  1985.3 1987.7 1990.2 1992.8 1995.9 1998.5 1999.4
Note: Population-weighted mean for all the surveys used to estimate the poverty measures for each 
reference year (Appendix).  29
Table 2: Estimates for China by old and new methods 
 













1981 $1.08  63.76   
 $2.15  88.12  
      
1984 $1.08  40.99   
 $2.15  78.49  
      
1987 $1.08  28.45   
 $2.15  67.41  
      
1990   $1.08  31.53  33.01 
 $2.15  69.93  72.64 
      
1993   $1.08  29.46  28.36 
 $2.15  64.59  68.13 
      
1996   $1.08  16.91  17.38 
 $2.15  50.63  53.36 
      
1999   $1.08  16.42  17.77 
 $2.15  47.19  50.05 
      
2001   $1.08  16.51  16.64 
 $2.15  44.45  46.67 
 Table 3: Headcount indices of poverty 
 
  % living below $1.08 per day at 1993 PPP 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  57.7 38.9 28.0 29.6 24.9 16.6 15.7 14.9 
      Of which China  63.8  41.0  28.5  33.0  28.4  17.4  17.8  16.6 
      East Asia excluding China  42.0  33.5  27.0  21.1  16.7  14.7  11.0  10.8 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 3.7 4.3 6.3 3.6 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean  9.7  11.8 10.9 11.3 11.3 10.7 10.5  9.5 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  5.1 3.8 3.2 2.3 1.6 2.0 2.6 2.4 
South  Asia  51.5 46.8 45.0 41.3 40.1 36.6 32.2 31.3 
      Of which India  54.4  49.8  46.3  42.1  42.3  42.2  35.3  34.7 
      South Asia excluding India  42.2  37.0  41.0  38.7  33.1  19.7  22.9  21.0 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  41.6 46.3 46.8 44.6 44.1 45.6 45.7 46.4 
Total  40.4 32.8 28.4 27.9 26.3 22.8 21.8 21.1 
Total  excluding  China  31.7 29.8 28.4 26.1 25.6 24.6 23.1 22.5 
  % living below $2.15 per day at 1993 PPP 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  84.8 76.6 67.7 69.9 64.8 53.3 50.3 47.4 
      Of which China  88.1  78.5  67.4  72.6  68.1  53.4  50.1  46.7 
      East Asia excluding China  76.2  72.0  68.4  63.2  56.7  53.2  50.8  49.2 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  4.7 4.1 3.2 4.9  17.3  20.7  23.8  19.7 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean 26.9 30.4 27.8 28.4 29.5 24.1 25.1 24.5 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa 28.9 25.2 24.2 21.4 20.2 22.3 24.3 23.2 
South  Asia  89.1 87.2 86.7 85.5 84.5 81.7 78.1 77.2 
      Of which India  89.6  88.2  87.3  86.1  85.7  85.2  80.6  79.9 
      South Asia excluding India  87.3  84.0  85.0  83.5  81.0  71.3  70.5  69.0 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  73.3 76.1 76.1 75.0 74.6 75.1 76.0 76.6 
Total  66.7 63.7 60.1 60.8 60.2 55.5 54.4 52.9 
Total  excluding  China  58.8 58.4 57.5 56.6 57.4 56.3 55.8 54.9 
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   Table 4: Numbers of poor 
 
  Number of people living below $1.08 per day (million) 
  1981  1984 1987  1990  1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  795.6  562.2 425.6  472.2  415.4 286.7 281.7 271.3 
      Of which China  633.7  425.0  308.4  374.8  334.2  211.6  222.8  211.6 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  3.1  2.4  1.7  2.3  17.5 20.1 30.1 17.0 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean  35.6  46.0 45.1  49.3  52.0 52.2 53.6 49.8 
Middle East and North Africa  9.1  7.6  6.9  5.5  4.0  5.5  7.7  7.1 
South  Asia  474.8  460.3 473.3  462.3  476.2 461.3 428.5 431.1 
      Of which India  382.4  373.5  369.8  357.4  380.0  399.5  352.4  358.6 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  163.6  198.3 218.6  226.8  242.3 271.4 294.3 312.7 
Total  1481.8 1276.8 1171.2  1218.5  1207.5 1097.2 1095.7 1089.0 
  Number of people living below $2.15 per day (million) 
  1981  1984 1987  1990  1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  1169.8 1108.6  1028.3 1116.3 1079.3 922.2 899.6 864.3 
      Of which China  875.8  813.8  730.8  824.6  802.9  649.6  627.5  593.6 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  20.2  18.3  14.7 22.9 81.3  97.8  113.0  93.3 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean  98.9 118.9 115.4  124.6  136.1 117.2 127.4 128.2 
Middle East and North Africa  51.9  49.8  52.5  50.9  51.8  60.9  70.4  69.8 
South  Asia  821.1  858.6  911.4  957.5  1004.8 1029.1 1039.0 1063.7 
      Of which India  630.0  661.4  697.1  731.4  769.5  805.7  804.4  826.0 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  287.9  326.0 355.2  381.6  410.4 446.8 489.3 516.0 
Total  2450.0 2480.1 2477.5  2653.8  2763.6 2674.1 2738.8 2735.4 
 Table 5: Trend rates of change in the $1 per day headcount index 
 
Trend rates of change in the 
headcount index for $1.08 per 
day (% points per year)  1981-2001  1984-2001 
Critical rate for 
halving the 1990 
headcount index  
(% points per year) 
East Asia  -1.87*  -1.36*  -0.59 
 (0.32)  (0.19)   
      Of which China  -1.99*  -1.37*  -0.66 
 (0.40)  (0.26)   
Latin America and Caribbean  -0.03  -0.10  -0.23 
 (0.04)  (0.03)   
South Asia  -0.98*  -0.95*  -0.83 
 (0.05)  (0.05)   
      Of which India  -0.91*  -0.83*  -0.84 
 (0.10)  (0.12)   
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.12  0.00  -0.89 
 (0.09)  (0.08)   
Total -0.86*  -0.66*  -0.56 
 (0.12)  (0.06)   
Note: Trends estimated by linear regression on time.  Standard errors in parentheses.   
* indicates that the trend is significantly different from zero at the 1% level.  All  
regressions were tested for first-order serial correlation in the errors using the  
Lagrange Multiplier tests.  The null hypothesis of serial independence could not  
be rejected in any case.   Table 6: Poverty gap indices 
 
Poverty gap index as %  $1.08 per day 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  20.58  11.11  7.69 7.65 6.13 3.52 3.57 3.35 
      Of which China  23.41  11.82  8.17  8.87  7.34  3.82  4.18  3.94 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  0.18 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.84 1.25 1.86 0.75 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean 2.75 3.45 3.36 3.57 3.52 2.36 4.03 3.36 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa 1.00 0.76 0.61 0.49 0.27 0.39 0.53 0.45 
South  Asia  16.06 13.86 12.35 11.00 10.21  8.97  6.63  6.37 
      Of which India  17.27  14.99  12.68  11.09  10.86  10.55  7.22  7.08 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  17.03 19.65 20.10 19.07 19.24 19.80 20.10 20.53 
Total  13.92  10.20  8.64 8.23 7.62 6.44 6.20 5.99 
  $ 2.15 per day 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  47.20 36.45 29.36 30.55 27.22 19.95 18.94 17.78 
      Of which China  50.82  37.92  29.67  32.94  29.85  20.33  19.79  18.44 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  1.43 1.16 0.87 1.35 5.49 7.06 8.25 5.87 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean  10.66 12.44 11.48 11.81 12.04  9.25  10.97 10.20 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa 8.81 7.36 6.80 5.69 5.05 5.74 6.54 6.14 
South  Asia  45.78 43.02 41.86 39.92 38.84 36.52 32.98 32.35 
      Of which India  47.22  44.68  42.52  40.43  40.10  39.93  34.89  34.43 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  38.54 41.77 42.14 40.77 40.53 41.24 41.79 41.42 
Total  35.02 30.79 27.86 27.80 26.82 23.76 23.05 22.20 
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Table 7: Mean income of the poor in $ per day 
 
$1.08 per day 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  0.69 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.83 
      Of which China  0.68  0.77  0.77  0.79  0.80  0.84  0.82  0.82 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  0.81 0.80 0.76 0.85 0.83 0.76 0.76 0.91 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.84 0.66 0.70 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.87 0.86 0.87 
South  Asia  0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.85 0.86 
      Of which India  0.73  0.75  0.78  0.79  0.80  0.81  0.86  0.86 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  0.64 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.60 
Total  0.70 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 
$2.15 per day 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  0.95 1.13 1.22 1.21 1.25 1.35 1.34 1.35 
      Of which China  0.91  1.11  1.21  1.18  1.21  1.33  1.30  1.30 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  1.50 1.55 1.57 1.56 1.47 1.42 1.41 1.51 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean 1.30 1.27 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.33 1.21 1.26 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa 1.50 1.52 1.55 1.58 1.61 1.60 1.57 1.58 
South  Asia  1.05 1.09 1.11 1.15 1.16 1.19 1.24 1.25 
      Of which India  1.02  1.06  1.10  1.14  1.15  1.14  1.22  1.23 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  1.02 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99 
Total  1.02 1.11 1.15 1.17 1.19 1.23 1.24 1.25 
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Table 8: Relative poverty measures 
 
  Headcount index of relative poverty (%) 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  63.15 44.45 33.92 35.31 30.17 21.48 20.86 19.69 
      Of which China  63.76  41.01  28.45  33.01  28.36  17.38  17.77  16.64 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  8.11  7.53  6.41  7.77  22.65 23.17 27.17 21.49 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean  40.55 45.37 42.34 43.28 44.97 39.39 38.98 39.77 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  37.36 33.40 21.80 19.29 17.58 17.16 18.26 16.91 
South  Asia  58.17 50.65 47.72 41.45 40.33 36.87 32.09 31.41 
      Of which India  62.55  54.50  49.43  42.07  42.31  42.25  35.33  34.70 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  45.93 50.48 51.27 47.61 47.56 48.71 49.66 50.18 
Total  50.1 42.0 36.6 35.3 34.9 30.6 29.8 28.8 
  Number of poor (millions) 
  1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2001 
East  Asia  871.3 642.9 515.2 563.7 502.6 371.4 373.1 358.8 
      Of which China  633.7  425.2  308.4  374.8  334.2  211.6  222.8  211.6 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia  34.9 33.3 29.2 36.2  106.8  109.6  128.9  102.0 
Latin  America  and  Caribbean  149.1 177.6 175.6 189.8 207.8 191.3 198.1 208.3 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa 67.1 66.1 47.3 45.8 45.0 46.8 52.8 50.8 
South  Asia  536.2 498.6 501.4 464.5 479.4 464.1 426.9 432.8 
      Of which India  439.6  408.6  394.8  357.4  380.0  399.5  352.4  358.6 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  180.5 216.4 239.3 242.2 261.6 290.0 319.5 338.2 
Total  1839.2 1634.9 1508.0 1542.1 1603.2 1473.2 1499.4 1490.8 
 Appendix: Survey data set 
 
Region  % of 2001 
population 
Country  Survey dates   Welfare indicator 
 represented   
East Asia  96.11        
   Cambodia  1997    Expenditure 
   China  1980,  1981,  1984, 
1985, 1987, 1990 
 Income 
    1990,  1992,  1993, 
1996, 1999, 2001 
 Expenditure 
  Indonesia  1981,  1984,  1987,  1990,  1993, 
1996, 1999, 2002 
Expenditure 
  Laos  1992,  1997    Expenditure 
  Malaysia  1984,  1987,  1989,  1992,  1995, 
1997 
Income 
  Mongolia  1995,1998    Expenditure 
  Philippines  1985,  1988,  1991,  1994,  1997, 
2000 
Expenditure 
  Thailand  1981,  1988    Income 
    1988, 1992, 1996, 1998, 1999. 
2000, 2002 
Expenditure 
  Vietnam  1992/93,  1998  Expenditure 
97.32        
 Albania  1997,  2002  Expenditure 
 Armenia  1988,  1996  Income 
   1996,  1998  Expenditure 
 Azerbaijan  1988  Income 
   1995,  2001  Expenditure 
Eastern Europe 
& Central Asia 
  Belarus  1988, 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999  Income 
    1996-2000 Expenditure 
  Bulgaria  1989,  1992,  1994,  1995,  1997, 
2001 
Expenditure 
    1993,  1996  Income 
  Croatia  1998,  1999,  2000,  2001  Expenditure 
    1988,  1998  Income 
  Czech  Republic 1988, 1993,1996   Income 
  Estonia  1988,  1993,  1995,1998  Income 
  Georgia  1989,  1996,  1997    Income 
    1996,  1998-2001    Expenditure 
  Hungary  1989,  1993-1996,  1998  Income 
  Kazakhstan  1988,  1993    Income 
   1993,  1996,  2000    Expenditure 
  Kyrgyz  Republic  1988,  1993,  1996,  1998  Income 
   1993,  1997-2001    Expenditure 
  Latvia  1988,  1993,  1995,  1998  Income 
  Lithuania  1988,  1993,  1994,  1996,  2000  Income 
    1996,  1998,  2000  Expenditure 
  Macedonia  1988    Income   37
    1998    Expenditure 
  Moldova  1988,  1992,  1997    Income 
    1997-2001    Expenditure 
    Poland  1985, 1987, 1989, 1993 ,1998  Income  
   1990,  1992,  1993-96   Expenditure 
  Romania  1989,  1992,  1994    Income 
    1998,  2000    Expenditure 
    Russian Federation  1988, 1993   Income    
    1993, 1996, 1998, 2000  Expenditure  
  Slovak  Republic  1988,  1992,  1996    Income   
  Slovenia  1987,  1993,  1996,  1998  Income   
  Tajikistan  1998    Expenditure 
  Turkey  1987,  1994,  2000    Expenditure 
  Turkmenistan  1988,  1993,  1998    Income   
  Ukraine  1988,  1992,  1997    Income     
   1995,  1996,  1999    Expenditure 
  Uzbekistan 1988,  1993    Income   
    1998,  2000    Expenditure 
95.31        
  Argentina   1980, 1982, 1989, 1992, 1996, 
1998, 2001 
Income   
Latin America  
& Caribean 
  Bolivia  1986, 1990, 1997, 1999  Income   
    Brazil  1981, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988-
89, 1990, 1993, 1995-98, 2001 
Income   
  Chile  1987,  1990,  1992,  1994,  1996, 
1998, 2001 
Income   
  Colombia  1980,  1988,  1989,  1991,  1995-
96, 1998-1999 
Income   
    Costa Rica  1981, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1993, 
1996-1998, 2001 
Income   
    Dominican Republic 1986, 1989, 1992,1996, 1998  Income   
  Ecuador  1988,  1994-95,  1998   Income 
    1994-95    Expenditure 
    El Salvador  1989, 1995-98, 2000  Income   
  Guatemala  1986,  1989,  1998,  2000  Income   
  Guyana  1993,  1998  Expenditure 
  Honduras  1986,  1989-90,  1992,  1994, 
1996-1999 
Income   
  Jamaica  1988-94,  1996-2000    Expenditure 
  Mexico  1984,  1992    Expenditure 
    1989, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000  Income   
  Nicaragua  1993,  1998    Expenditure 
  Panama  1979,  1989,  1991,  1995-98, 
2000 
Income   
  Paraguay  1990,  1995,  1997-1999  Income   
  Peru  1985,  1994,  1996    Expenditure 
   1994,  1996,  2000    Income   
  St.  Lucia  1995    Income   
  Trinidad  and  Tobago 1988,  1992  Income     38
  Uruguay  1981,  1989,  1996-1998,  2000  Income   
  Venezuela  1981,  1987,  1989,  1991,  1993, 
1995-98 
Income 
Middle East  &  74.05        
North Africa    Algeria  1988, 1995   Expenditure 
    Egypt, Arab Rep.  1991, 1995, 2000   Expenditure 
  Iran  1986,  1990,  1994,  1998  Expenditure 
  Jordan  1987,  1992,  1997    Expenditure 
  Morocco  1985,  1990,  1998/99   Expenditure 
  Tunisia  1985,  1990,  1995,  2000  Expenditure 
  Yemen  1992,  1998    Expenditure 
South Asia  98.09       
    Bangladesh  1983/84, 1984-85, 1988, 1992, 
1996, 2000 
Expenditure 
  India  1977/78,  1983,  1986-91, 
1993/94, 1995/96, 1999/2000 
Expenditure 
  Nepal  1985,  1995    Expenditure 
  Pakistan  1986/87,  1990/91,  1992/93, 
1996/97, 1998 
Expenditure 
  Sri  Lanka  1980,  1985,  1990,  1995  Expenditure 
Sub-Saharan 77.86         
Africa   Botswana  1985/86,  1993    Expenditure 
    Burkina Faso  1994, 1998   Expenditure 
  Burundi  1992,  1998    Expenditure 
  Cameroon  1996    Expenditure 
  Central  African  Rep. 1993    Expenditure 
  Cote  d'Ivoire  1985-88,  1993,  1995,  1998 Expenditure 
  Ethiopia  1981,  1995,  2000    Expenditure 
  Gambia  1992,  1998    Expenditure 
  Ghana  1987,  1989,  1998    Expenditure 
  Kenya  1992,  1994,  1997    Expenditure 
  Lesotho  1986,  1993,  1995    Expenditure 
  Madagascar  1980,  1993,  1999    Expenditure 
  Mali  1989,  1994    Expenditure 
  Malawi  1997    Expenditure 
  Mauritania  1988,  1993,  1995,  2000    Expenditure 
  Mozambique  1996/97    Expenditure 
  Namibia  1993    Expenditure 
  Niger  1992,  1995    Expenditure 
  Nigeria  1985,  1992,  1997    Expenditure 
  Rwanda  1983/85    Expenditure 
  Senegal  1991,  1994    Expenditure 
  Sierra  Leone  1989    Expenditure 
  South  Africa  1993,  1995,  2000  Expenditure 
  Swaziland  1994  Expenditure 
  Tanzania  1991    Expenditure 
  Uganda  1988,  1992,  1996,  1999  Expenditure 
  Zambia  1991,  1993,  1996,  1998  Expenditure 
  Zimbabwe  1990/91,  1995    Expenditure   39













   40




























































Developing world as a whole
Excluding China
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